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Abstract: The Default Skeptical Stance (DSS) delineates dialectical partners behavior toward one another given the
adversariality thesis. Phyllis Rooney holds that the DSS, as a bridge between the formal and pragmatic elements of
adversariality, leads to epistemic dysfunction. This connection commits the Adversarialist to defending the DSS. My
modest version of this defense will be to show that the dysfunction in Rooney’s going case, the Penaluna – Leiter
exchange, is not attributable to argument’s skeptical norms.
Keywords: Adversariality, argumentation, default skeptical stance, epistemic injustice

1. Introduction
The Default Skeptical Stance (DSS) in argument is a practical manifestation of philosophy’s
adversarial paradigm. In “The Social & Political Limitations of Philosophy” Phyllis Rooney argues
that the DSS leads to epistemic dysfunction, and relatedly, hermeneutic injustice. To exemplify
her thesis, she analyzes the Penaluna – Leiter case. In this essay, I begin a modest defense of the
DSS, by noting that the going case to demonstrate that it leads to epistemic bads is not wellfounded. I show this by rethinking Rooney’s treatment of the Penaluna - Leiter (P – L) case. Like
Rooney, I hold that epistemic dysfunction occurs in the P – L exchange, but, unlike her, I argue
that the Default Skeptical Stance (DSS) is not its source.
2. The Adversariality Debate
The Adversariality Debate consists of two interconnected questions: Q1. Is argument intrinsically
adversarial? Q2. And, what norms obtain regarding how arguments must be managed in light of
the adversariality question? While two sides exist regarding the adversariality thesis, scholars on
both share (i) a formal concern that argument is theorized correctly, whether that be as inherently
adversarial or not, such that it produces the best epistemic results, and (ii) a pragmatic concern
that all persons receive equal consideration in argumentation as a practice of knowledge
production.
The divides in the contemporary debate descend from Trudy Govier’s Model for Minimal
Adversariality. Govier advocates the Adversarialist position, but presses the formal and pragmatic
theses together, via her Model for Minimal Adversariality:
1.
2.
3.
4.
5.
6.

I hold that X.
I think that X is correct (Follows from (1))
I think that not-X is not correct (Follows from (2))
I think that those who hold not-X are wrong, or are making a mistake. (Follows from (3))
Should I need to argue for X, I will thereby be arguing against not – X. (?)
Those who hold not-X, are, with regard to the correctness of X and my argument for X,
my opponents. (?) (p. 244).
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“Because there is this conflict of belief”, she concludes, “this hypothetical person may be regarded
as the opponent of the arguer. Thus it would appear, argument is at its very roots adversarial” (p.
243). The trouble is, as Non-Adversarialists commentators have pointed out, steps 1 -3 of Govier’s
model reflect a formal concern, while steps 4 – 6 represent a pragmatic one. Non – adversarialists
have held that this shows an error in reasoning for the adversariality thesis, and adversarialists hold
that there are two distinct but convergent lines of thought.
The conflation of the two programs opens Govier’s model to critique. Phyllis Rooney,
maintaining the Non-Adversarialist stance, critiques steps 4 – 6. The adversarial language therein,
she argues, adds an “extra and unnecessary step” (2010, p. 221). Because a belief is wrong does
not mean the person is wrong. The adversarial paradigm, she holds, simply misdescribes what
actual happens in argument (2010, p. 222). Likewise, Catherine Hundleby critiques 1 – 3. While
Govier’s model claims to deal with beliefs, the logical entailments she draws from them are proper
of commitments. If we’re really talking about beliefs, Hundleby argues, they don’t work this way
(2013, p. 252). Both Rooney and Hundleby hold, if argumentation is the means to knowledge, then
arguers are not opponents, but ultimately dialectical partners joined in the shared epistemic pursuit.
In response to these Non-Adversarialist critiques, contemporary Adversarialists, such as
Scott Aikin (2011, 2017) and John Casey (2019, 2020), motivate their stance via the formal
concern. By carefully distinguishing the two threads, they hold that adversariality is a formal
necessity, thus all pragmatic considerations, must be managed in light thereof. Without
adversariality argument ceases to be qua argument. When we debate, insofar as we take up
different sides of an issue, we present diametrically opposed reasons. Our reasons are minimallydialectically opposed (Aikin, 2011, 2017). While adversariality may produce negative practical
effects, it is compulsory. Adversariality in argument can be weaponized, but constitutes a
necessary risk. Rather than eliminate it, we must manage and mitigate its effects (Aikin, 2011).
Likewise, Casey defends the belief – person connection via the doxastic involuntarism thesis. If
argument deals in belief, because of doxastic involuntarism, adversariality is nonetheless
fundamental to argumentation (2019, p. 161).
Because Adversarialists motivate their thesis via the formal concern, they must accept that
negative practical consequences are often not prevented by the formal program. Their focus on the
ideal components of argument comes at the detriment of attending to non-ideal instances. NonAdversarialists center their argument on the adversarial disconnect between formal and pragmatic
concerns. Rooney homes in on this weakness. She holds that the DSS, which functions as the
bridge between the formal and pragmatic elements of adversariality in argument, leads to epistemic
dysfunction related to Fricker’s hermeneutic injustice.
The DSS delineates how dialectical partners orient themselves to one another given the
adversariality thesis. If argument is adversarial, then dialectical partners must be skeptically
engaged with one another. Of the relationship between adversariality and the DSS, Catherine
Hundleby writes:
The Adversary Method evaluates an argument by subjecting it “to the strongest or most
extreme position” (Moulton 1983, p. 153), in an attempt to get the best of both sides of a
dispute. The Method considers two contrasting views beginning with what we may call an
“oppositional” position, a contrary view on a particular topic and assumes the goal of
defeating another’s view. (2010, p. 284)
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Although, she does not name it as such, the behavior Hundleby describes is that of the DSS. The
practical means by which the Adversary method function is the DSS. It is the on-the-ground
manifestation of adversariality.
The DSS requires Arguer B adopt a critical stance toward A’s argument, wherein B
generates challenges and objections to A’s stance. As Rooney writes, the DSS entails the following
behaviors: “A’s initial premises may be questioned, for instance, or B might claim that the
premises in one of her subarguments do not provide sufficient warrant for the conclusion she draws
from them, or B might provide a counterargument” (2012, p. 320). Given the adversarial paradigm,
common practice is for Arguer A to present her best possible argument for stance A, then Arguer
B is to do her best to critique stance A. It is then Arguer A’s role to defend her thesis from B’s
attacks.
This connection commits the Adversarialist to the DSS, and so, to some kind of defense of
it. My modest version of this defense will be to show that in Rooney’s case against the DSS (and
the adversarialist position by extension), the epistemic dysfunction in her prime example, the P –
L case, is NOT attributable to argument’s skeptical norms. Rather, a complete lack of critical
engagement leads Leiter to ignore and effectively silence Penaluna.
3. Rooney’s analysis
Just as the concern regarding adversariality in philosophy is its paradigm status, the concern
regarding the DSS is its default status. Rooney writes: “According to standard norms of
philosophical adversarial argumentation B is expected to challenge and question any of A’s claims
that he finds less than plausible, thus placing the burden of proof on A” (2012, p. 325, emphasis
mine). The Adversarial Paradigm requires arguers engage skeptically with one another’s reasons.
It is not merely an option to be critical, but a necessity.
The DSS ignores facts about arguers and their unequal standing. As the formal framework
made manifest, it is unable to adjust to context. Note insofar as Rooney’s critique stems from realworld concerns, her objection is in the form of non-ideal argumentative theory. According to
Rooney, the DSS precipitates epistemic dysfunction, because of how it distributes the burden of
proof (BoP) in cases where individuals of historically marginalized epistemic populations argue
from experience-based claims. She writes: “I want to draw attention to forms of adversarial
argumentation in philosophy that can effectively silence or misrepresent the contributions of those
who belong to minority or marginalized subgroups in the discipline, and especially when they seek
to address concerns that are of special significance for their subgroup” (2012, p. 318). On her view,
the level of skepticism directed at these individuals’ arguments ought to be adjusted in relation to
social identity. If we lack our interlocutors basic experience, and the building blocks of their
argument come from experience, it will be nearly impossible for them - within the argumentative
norms delineated by the DSS - to prove their point to us. In this case, the DSS does not prevent
epistemic tyranny, but seems to suggest it, by re-enforcing the marginalization of epistemic
minorities.
When the formal adversarial framework meets non-ideal conditions, the DSS does not
allow arguers to adjust accordingly. The Non-Adversarialist concern, as expressed by Rooney, is
that the DSS leads to unduly severe critique when Arguer A is of minority identity, particularly
when she takes her own experience as a premise. Because the BoP returns to A, in such cases, she
is left without further dialectical resource to counter B. She writes: “epistemic injustice is likely to
be exacerbated in skepticism – informed argumentative exchanges where minority members,
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whose experiences and claims are likely to be given less credibility, are thereby assigned greater
burdens of proof. Such exchanges may, therefore, undermine equity in what we might think of as
the discursive space of philosophical argumentation” (2012, p. 319). Here Rooney reasons, when
part of Arguer A’s argument is based on social experience as a minority identity, Arguer B is
allowed, even required, by the DSS to question and resist Argument A. Without his shouldering
the BoP too, it is impossible to bridge the gap of experience between different social identities.
For B to be persuaded, he’d need to do something. Yet by the DSS, Rooney reasons, the burden
of proof returns to A, leaving her with no further dialectical resource to persuade B.
To demonstrate how the DSS can lead to hermeneutic injustice, Rooney analyzes Brian
Leiter’s blogpost in response to Regan Penaluna’s article “Wanted: Female Philosophers, in the
Classroom and in the Canon.” Leiter is an American philosopher most known for his controversial
ranking of graduate philosophy programs, and his equally controversial philosophy blog, Leiter
Reports. He is notorious for supporting big-name analytic departments in the former, and for
amplifying misogynistic and racist views in the latter. Rooney notes that in her article, Penaluna
reports the small number of undergraduate female philosophers, and enumerates a series of
plausible causal factors, including the lack of historical women thinkers in the canon, the misogyny
of canonized philosophers, the particular regard philosophy holds for its canon, and as a result, the
discipline’s resistance to feminist critique (2012, p. 326).
Of Leiter’s response to Penaluna’s article, Rooney explains –
A few days after the publication of Penaluna’s article, Brian Leiter initiated a discussion
of the article in his popular blog Leiter Reports. To his title question, “Why aren’t there
more women in academic philosophy?”, Leiter responds, “Regan Penaluna offers the
following explanation…”, and he then quotes two paragraphs from her article, one in which
she remarks that the study of philosophy is typically the study of the texts of dead white
men, and one in which she draws attention to the recurring sexist and misogynist comments
by these same dead white men. Leiter then invites discussion: he says, “I wonder how
plausible the reader finds this explanation?” with, it seems to me, the clear suggestion that
he does not find it plausible. (2012, p. 327)
Leiter’s audience follows up with comments, including: “This is implausible,” “This is merely
anecdotal” (2012, p. 327 - 329). The result is a complete dismissal of Penaluna’s argument. Leiter
and his correspondents leave Penaluna with the duty to respond, but no dialectical resource to do
so. While he and his male-colleagues lack Penaluna’s experience as a woman in philosophy, the
DSS does not allow them to adjust the degree of skepticism in their response to her. They ought to
be interested in listening to Penaluna’s argument, because she shares an experience new to them.
Yet, the skeptical stance blocks the accessibility of not only this information, but this
epistemological attitude. On Rooney’s view, if what A argues is far beyond the scope of Arguer
B’s experience, the DSS does not provide B means to engage with A. Instead, it encourages B to
dismiss A.
4. Strawmanning
While I agree with Rooney that Leiter’s response to Penaluna is a case of epistemic dysfunction, I
argue that the site of that injustice is not the DSS. Instead, I hold that the problem is a critical lack
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of properly instituting the DSS. The DSS does not create the epistemic dysfunction, which
characterizes and drives Leiter’s behavior, and can, in fact, usefully capture its wrong.
Rooney’s concern is with the epistemic dysfunction, which follows from how the DSS
distributes BoP, but, she clearly states that Leiter strawmans Penaluna (2012, p. 327). This dualattribution of epistemic dysfunction is internally incoherent. The DSS, by definition, takes up with
the best version of a given argument, such as to contest it most soundly. However, to strawman
another’s argument is to intentionally misinterpret it, in order to make it weaker. Thus, the two
observations are at tension with one another.
A strawman is a dialectical move, in which Arguer B misrepresents Arguer A’s argument,
to Audience C. For the strawmans effectiveness, Audience C must be either i. ignorant to the
material at hand, and thus easily convinced, or ii. already biased in the direction of B’s views. This
group is B’s “preferred or ideal” audience. Leiter strawmans Penaluna insofar as he misinterprets
her argument to his chosen, ideal audience. The majority of Leiter Reports readers, as his blogposts
response indicates, unsurprisingly identify as “identity politics skeptics,” and are predisposed to
see Leiter as a default authority.
More specifically, Leiter weakmans Penaluna. To weakman an argument is to take up with
one strand of proof or evidence in another’s argument, and treat it as though it were the argument
in its entirety. As Aikin and Casey write in “Straw Men, Iron Men, and Argumentative Virtue”:
“...the weak man consists in 1) selecting the weakest of an opponent’s actual arguments, 2) actually
defeating it, and 3) then drawing or implying deeper conclusion the argument or arguer in
question” (p. 3). By refuting just one strand - typically, the weakest strand - of A’s argument, B
pretends to defeat A’s entire argument. While Penaluna is clear there are multiple effecting factors,
which work in tandem to discourage women from pursuing philosophy, Leiter lists only two, and
neglects to mention the intimate effective connection Penaluna notes between them. By choosing
just one strand of Penaluna’s critique, specifically that which identifies the causal role of the canon
in dissuading women from studying philosophy, and conflating that strand with her entire
argument, her argument is easily defeated. As Rooney notes, many responses to Leiter’s posting,
included counterexamples of other canonized disciplines such as History and English – and
historically male -dominated practices, such as law –, which while sharing this structural feature,
have much more equitable demographics. While these are good counter-examples to the
weakmanned version of Penaluna’s argument, they fail to address the full scope of factors she
actually considers.
Penaluna is left with no dialectical resource to respond to Leiter, not because of issues with
the BoP, but because the weakman is designed to quell all response from her. The format of the
Strawman is not to convince one’s dialogical partner, nor even to engage with them, but to appeal
against them to a sympathetic audience. It shuts down the very possibility of further proof from
Arguer A. The third party’s overwhelming dogmatic agreement with Arguer B silences A. She is
not silenced by some added burden of proof from the DSS. In fact, she is not called upon at all to
respond in this dialectical configuration. Although he appears to engage skeptically with Penaluna,
Leiter challenges only a weak-manned version of her argument. In as much, he challenges her
disingenuously. He does not challenge her in order to open up a space of reasons, and proper
skeptical exchange between them, but, to roast her in front of an ignorant audience. Before the
possibility of any skeptically configured exchange, Leiter turns away from the argument, and
allows a mob to end the debate.
Ultimately, strawmanning is not an instance of the skeptical stance, but, an abuse of it. The
epistemological dysfunction in the P -L case is actually located in Leiter’s refusal to critically
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engage with Penaluna. Insofar as he misrepresents Penaluna’s case, he fails to critically engage
with her. The proper skeptical method relies on taking up with the best version of an interlocutor’s
argument, such as to provide the best critique thereof, and thus have the greatest likelihood of
moving toward truth or agreement. As a background condition, the skeptical stance requires deep
critical engagement with one another’s arguments. It asks dialectical partners to take up with the
strongest version of one another’s arguments, and thus requires arguers do their best to understand
one another. For, the strongest skeptical pushback, will be in response to the best version of Arguer
A’s argument. The DSS requires dialectical partners to be critically engaged with one another’s
arguments. Thus, Leiter does not exercise the DSS, and Penaluna’s mistreatment cannot be
attributed to its distribution of the BoP.
In as much, Rooney’s initial concern regarding the distribution of proof in non-ideal
circumstances, which I articulate in Part II, is, in fact, consistent with the DSS and the adversarial
structural view. What’s at issue in argument are reasons. If there are reasons that require, because
of the epistemic position of the arguers, that arguers do more work to understand each other, then
that work is a necessary part of the adversarial method, too. The DSS prescribes this behavior. So,
if as Rooney notes, Penaluna’s social position will make particular pieces of evidence more
accessibly salient (she’ll see connections Leiter and his readers won’t), then it’s important for
arguers to make those things explicit. Epistemological standpoints are relevant considerations and
are ones consistent with the DSS and adversarial view.
5. Conclusion
Adversarialists are often critiqued for shaping real-world argumentative practices out of formal
requirements. Non-Adversarialists, like Rooney, worry that starting with the ideal – theoretic
framework necessarily leads to social epistemic harm. In “The Social & Political Limits of
Philosophy,” Rooney argues that the DSS, as the primary practical manifestation of the Adversarial
Paradigm, leads to bad epistemic results related to hermeneutic injustice. In this piece, I have
attempted a modest defense of the DSS by arguing that in Rooney’s example case, the DSS is not
what leads to epistemic dysfunction.
Clearly, though, there is epistemic dysfunction in the Penaluna – Leiter case. I have argued
that insofar as Leiter weakmans Penaluna’s argument, his exchange with her obscures the breadth
of her reasons. He does not respond to what she has actually argued, nor does he open up critical
exchange between them. The dialectical argumentative arrangement formed by appealing to a third
party, allows no space for her to challenge Leiter in return. As a parting thought, I suggest this case
indicates the DSS, when properly deployed, might actually prevent this kind of silencing. Proper
skeptical engagement requires Arguer B to actually hear and respond to A’s argument. In effect,
critical engagement is the background condition of the DSS. Thus, by the DSS, argumentative
responses must engage with the reasons given for interlocutor’s positions, and so, would prohibit
the kind of silencing Penaluna experiences in the P – L case.
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